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Abstract
In Negotiorum Gestio, the actor implements the act of 
safeguarding or enlarging beneficiary’s interest based 
on morality without any actual benefit. This runs against 
Rational Man Hypothesis in economics, and the actor 
should have no incentive when the behavior would not 
maximize its personal economic interests. This article will 
take a game theory analysis on Negotiorum Gestio in self-
study room, in order to strive the reasonable incentive for 
a rational man to act Negotiorum Gestio.
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INTRODUCTION
A rational man will maximize his or her benefit at a lowest 
cost	in	Rational	Man	Hypothesis	(Stiglitz	&	Walsh	2013,	
p.24). Negotiorum Gestio describes a situation that one 
person would take careful of other’s business in order to 
avoid other’s loss and without any statutory or contractual 
obligaton.1 These two things are highly likely conflict, 
1 General Provisions of the Civil Law of PRC, Article 121. A person 
who, under no statutory or contractual obligation, manages the 
business of another to prevent damage to the interest of another shall 
have	the	right	 to	request	 that	 the	beneficiary	of	such	management	
reimburse the manager for necessary expenses incurred.
the management (I will call Negotiorum Gestio as “the 
management” in the following.) is motivated by protecting 
other’s benefit and is facing with the risk of expenditure. 
More badly, the actor may assume civil liability when the 
management constitutes torts (Dawson, 1961). In other 
words, a person cannot expect any monetary income 
in the management, and must take the civil liability 
possibility into account, so a rational man definitely has 
no incentive in doing so. However, actually, there is plenty 
of Negotiorum Gestio cases, which means that incentive 
indeed exists and it is not possible that all actors are not 
economic “rational”. This paper will do a game theory 
analysis in a self-study room management model to look 
for the actual incentive in Negotiorum Gestio.
1. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN 
NEGOTIORUM GESTIO AND ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVE
We	will	 look	 into	 the	design	of	Negotiorum	Gestio	 in	
order to find out whether the legislative guidance itself 
has incentive for a rational man.
1.1 The Intention of Negotiorum Gestio
As to this question, one viewpoint is that the purpose of 
Negotiorum Gestio is to reward people for helping each 
other. Because of our social attribute, other’s favor is 
essential, Negotiorum Gestio can balance the benefits 
between actors and beneficiaries, so that the total societal 
welfare could be promoted. Normally, one cannot 
interfere with other’s business, or he/she would be liable 
for torts. However, this common rule can make a hard 
time for everyone’s demand on other’s help, even though 
the management could reduce people’s loss and enhance 
their interests (Shi, 2000, pp.57-58). Legislators and 
law scholars should devote themselves to coordinate the 
interaction between “stop meddling” and “rewarding help” 
(Ibid., p.331). In the meanwhile, the law should permit 
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the actor to manage other’s business so that people would 
not worry about being liable for torts and Negotiorum 
Gestio should take the responsibility to harmonize actor’s 
and	beneficiary’s	benefits	 (Wang,	2005,	p.64).	Another	
viewpoint focuses on speaking highly of prevailing moral 
practices, clarifying property rights and safeguarding 
orderly transaction environment. The reasons that why 
Negotiorum Gestio is established by law are that: to 
enhance the pleasure in helping others, to avoid avoidable 
property loss, to develop good property and transaction 
rules	(Wang,	2001).
The second point of view is more precise. The first 
one emphasize “reward”, nevertheless, the actor not 
only has no extra income, but also will bear the risk on 
compensating the beneficiary for torts. Thus, it is hardly to 
find some underline implication of “reward”. Negotiorum 
Gestio entitles the actor a chance to seek compensation 
for the management cost, this measurement will certainly 
encourage people to do the management with less 
misgivings. Yet, no matter which viewpoint, promoting 
actor’s benefit is not included, which means that there 
is no intention in Negotiorum Gestio may become a 
motivation for a rational man to do the management.
1.2 There Is No Incentive in Negotiorum Gestio Itself
For the actor, without any contractual or statutory liability, 
all the targets doing the management are to protect 
beneficiary’s interests. According to Negotiorum Gestio 
in General Provision of the Civil Law of PRC, the best 
outcome for the actor is to get the management monetary 
cost or loss back.2 Besides economic expenditure, any 
other cost, for example, time or opportunity cost, is out of 
the question. A rational man has a lasting hope to improve 
its own situations, and willing to work on this insistently. 
When	 it	 comes	 to	Negotiorum	Gestio,	which	has	 no	
foreseeable income and is companied with civil liability 
risk, a rational man should have zero incentive for this.
2. NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY OF 
NEGOTIORUM GESTIO IN SELF-STUDY 
ROOM
Although there is no incentive in Negotiorum Gestio, we 
are curious about why lots of Negotiorum Gestio cases 
in practice.3 University self-study room is a place where 
larceny happens frequently, if the management could take 
place, larceny may be restrained. This provides us with a 
2	General	Provisions	of	the	Civil	Law	of	PRC,	Article	122.	Where	
a person is unjustly enriched without any legal basis, the person 
who	so	suffers	a	loss	shall	have	the	right	to	request	that	the	person	
unjustly enriched return the amount to the extent of the unjust 
enrichment.
3 Data resource: Search “Negotiorum Gestio” in Pkulaw.cn database, 
we got 1591 civil judgements and decisions. Retrieved from http://
www.pkulaw.cn/case/adv.
perfect situation to exam incentives for the management. 
Thus, we take self-study room as instance to do a game 
theory analysis on Negotiorum Gestio, before that, we 
must discuss whether the management is necessary and 
possible in self-study room.
2.1 The Necessity
Negotiorum Gestio in self-study room is necessary 
because we have a lot of universities and larceny happens 
quite constantly. According to the latest data from 
National Bureau of Statistics of PRC, by the end of 2015, 
we got 2,560 universities and colleges with 26,253,000 
students.4 In the same time, especially at the end of the 
term, for students, self-study occupies vast majority’s 
daily life. Thanks to the improvement of people’s standard 
of living, high-value personal stuff like computers and 
smart phones become every day carry for most students. 
Students have to leave their seats for restroom or picking 
up a phone call during their self-study, the most prudent 
student will take all valuable belongings with them, but 
the majority will be bothered by the tedious steps because 
it is just a short absence. It is the carelessness of most 
students that give thieves opportunities to steal.
On May 24, 2014, Beijing police department caught a 
suspect of 7-time self-study room larceny;5 On December 
15, 2014, Jiangxi Moring Daily reported that a habitual 
self-study room larceny offender was still on the wanted 
list.6 On July 23, 2015, Jinan police department caught a 
suspect of 30-time self-study room larceny with more than 
50,000 RMB stolen goods.7 On August 30, 2016, Nanjing 
TV reported that a self-study room larceny suspect was 
captured by surveillance camera.8 Thus, overall, self-study 
room larceny exists widely and harmful. Beijing Supreme 
Court regards larceny case with stolen goods which values 
more than 2,000 RMB as “relatively large amount”.9 2000 
RMB is an easy threshold for a smart phone, not saying 
personal computers, in other words, self-study larceny is 
more than petty theft and should be paid serious attention.
4 National Bureau of Statistics of China. Retrieved from http://data.
stats.gov.cn/search.htm?s=2017%20普通高等学校%20在校生.
5	White	collar	caught	for	7	times	self-study	room	burglary,	(2014.6),	
Chinanews.com, retrieved from http://www.chinanews.com/
fz/2014/06-16/6282716.shtml.
6 Self-study room burglary happens a lot in Nanchang University, 
(2014.12), Nc.Jxnews.com.cn, retrieved from http://nc.jxnews.com.
cn/system/2014/12/15/013496902.shtml.
7 A 50-year-old man stole for unleashing in university self-study 
rooms, (2015.7), Jiangsu.china.com.cn, retrieved from http://jiangsu.
china.com.cn/html/law/case/2073281_3.html.
8 University self-study rooms are popular targets for thieves, 
(2016.8), Nbs, retrieved from http://www.nbs.cn/tv/11/2/201608/
t20160830_362360.html.
9 Some opinions on the judicial interpretation of the application of 
the criminal cases of theft by the high people’s Court of Beijing: 
when courts hear criminal cases of theft stipulated in the 264th 
provision of the criminal law. The standard of “larger amount” is 
two thousand yuan or more. The standard of “huge amount” is sixty 
thousand yuan or more. The standard of “huge sum” is four hundred 
thousand yuan or more.
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2.2 Self-Study Room Management Is Possible to 
Contain Larceny
Self-study room is not only a suitable place for larceny, 
but also a wonderful situation with natural advantages in 
taking precaution. Students may know each other, if not, 
at least, they may have a rough impression on external 
features	of	their	neighborhoods.	When	a	thief	is	stealing,	
it is not difficult for a nearby student to notice that 
something is wrong. If the vigilant student could interrupt 
the thief with merely some questions, it is high likely that 
the thief would give up because of nervousness and fear. 
The aforementioned is a kind of management behavior, 
if it could satisfy the four essential factors of Negotiorum 
Gestio	(Wang,	2001,	p.336),	 then	we	could	take	it	as	an	
example and run further analysis.
The first factor is managing other’s business. Self-
study room management stops thief from harming other’s 
property rather than actor’s, the management is legal, and 
could trigger Negotiorum Gestio obligation. The second 
factor is that actor has the intention to manage. The actor 
in self-study room management clearly knows that it is 
acting on the behalf of other’s interests, the management 
could not be done by accident or unintentionally. The 
third one is that there are no statutory or contractual 
obligations. Actors are usually beneficiaries’ schoolmates, 
no managerial obligation exists between them. The last 
factor is that the management must benefit the beneficiary 
and cannot run counter to beneficiary’s express or implied 
intention, this factor is critical on deciding whether the 
management is legal. Obviously, nobody wishes her/his 
personal property to be stolen wherever, whenever, thus 
the management coincides with beneficiary’s intention 
exactly. As a result, self-study room management satisfies 
all essential factors of Negotiorum Gestio, and we can 
call it “Self-study room Negotiorum Gestio”.
3 .  G A M E  T H E O RY A N A LY S I S  O F 
INCENTIVES IN SELF-STUDY ROOM 
NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
By virtue of the management in self-study room meets 
all requirements of Negotiorum Gestio, a game theory 
analysis can be taken to probe into rational man’s 
incentives.
We	establish	 a	 complete	 information	 static	 game,	
assume two players A and B. Each player has two 
strategies, careful and careless, careful means paying 
attention to neighborhood’s external features and 
being vigilant, careless means the opposite. The rules 
are as following: (a) the cost of careful is 2, due to its 
disturbance on self-study, marked as -2 in the model; (b) 
the cost of careless is zero; (c) if one chooses careful, then 
the other’s property would be safer and the beneficiary 
will enjoy 10 benefit; (d) if one chooses careless, then the 
other’s property is less safe, however, since larceny not 
happens 100% when student left their seats, we assume a 
50% taking place rate, so the potential loss is 10 * 50% = 
5, marked as -5 in the model. Then we could get a matrix 
like Table 1.
Table 1
Initial Strategy Matrix
B
Strategy Careful Careless
A Careful 8, 8 -7, 10Careless 10, -7 -5, -5
Because A and B share the same reaction function, we 
can know the whole picture via analyzing one of them. 
According to “Strict Bad Strategy Elimination Method”, 
as for B, no matter what strategy A takes, careful is the 
bad strategy. Specifically, when A choose careful, because 
10 > 8, B will take careless; when A choose careless, 
because -5 > -7, B will stay with careless. Namely, 
careless is the better choice for B, then the model becomes 
Table 2.
Table 2
B’s Better Strategy
B
Strategy Careless
A Careful -7, 10
Careless -5, -5
At this time, as for A, because -5 > -7, A will definitely 
take careless. Then the model changes to Table 3.
Table 3
A Nash Equilibrium
B
Strategy Careless
A Careless -5, -5
Here we get a Nash Equilibrium, each party will 
take careless strategy. This result perfectly matches with 
the conclusion we got before: A rational man has no 
incentive in Negotiorum Gestio. This phenomenon is 
so obvious that thieves know exactly, so they can steal 
siting back and relax. In the personal perspective, even if 
a person was warm-hearted and delighted to take careful 
of other’s business, normally, others would take this for 
granted and keep careless because they would harvest 
the maximum revenue without any cost. In a long term, 
the warm-hearted person is highly likely to give up, in 
the light of her/his benefit is -7, less than -5. Then (-5, 
-5) equilibrium backs. However, in the view of societal 
welfare, when (-5, -5) equilibrium reaches, societal 
welfare is -5 + (-5) = -10; when one player takes careful 
and the other takes careless, the societal welfare is 10 + 
(-7) = 3; when both players choose careful, it is 8 + 8 = 
16. As a consequence, when each player takes careful, in 
other words, cooperation, will bring the best return for 
55 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
XU Hong (2018). 
Canadian Social Science, 14(1), 52-55
the society as a whole. In the meanwhile, nevertheless, 
the (-5, -5) equilibrium brings the worst societal welfare. 
Although cooperation requires -2 cost, it has the best 
societal welfare and second best personal benefit, while 
the (-5, -5) equilibrium has worst societal welfare and 
second worst personal benefit. Thus, when each player 
takes careful instead of careless, a Pareto Improvement 
realizes. Here, even an economic rational man will choose 
careful strategy and this is the incentive for Negotiorum 
Gestio.
CONCLUSION
There is a conflict between Negotiorum Gestio’s intention 
and Rational Man Hypothesis, the former wishes people to 
help each other but offering no incentive for an economic 
rational man. In theory, no one will do the management, 
actually, hundreds of judicial cases in practice. Given 
these contradictions, we build a game theory model 
based on university self-study room example. According 
to this paper’s theoretical deduction and game theory 
analysis, initially, an economic rational man does have 
no incentive for Negotiorum Gestio. Then, when taking 
societal welfare into consideration, a Pareto Improvement 
will be brought by each player via cooperation, which 
provides even a rational man with sufficient incentive for 
Negotiorum Gestio.
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